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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF THE COUNTY IN WHICH
THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT IS LOCATED
ROBERT E. WOODSIDE*
As a result of being in "the county in which the scat of government is
located" the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County occupies a unique
position among the Courts of Pennsylvania.
It is our intention in this article to outline briefly some of the steps in
the development of its special jurisdiction, and to make brief reference to the
practice before it. This article should not be considered a detailed or com-
prehensive account of its history, jurisdiction, or practice.
At the present time the Common Pleas Court is composed of three judges.
By Acts Nos. 216, 217 and 218 of 1937, a separate Orphans' Court was cre-
ated for Dauphin County, and given jurisdiction, along with the Court of
Common Pleas, to determine suits in which the Commonwealth is a party.'
A separate docket is kept in the Prothonotary's Office in Dauphin County,
known as the "Commonwealth Docket", in which are placed appeals and other
cases in which the Commonwealth is a party. (This, of course, does not include
criminal cases.) Naturally counsel from all over the state practice in what is
sometimes unofficially referred to as the "Commonwealth Court".
There have been numerous Acts passed giving the Common Pleas Court
of Dauphin County special jurisdiction, and reference is made hete to only a
few of the more important.
The Act of March 30, 18112 provided:
"That if any person or persons, body politic or corporate,
be dissatisfied with the settlement of his, her or their account,
by the auditor-general and state treasurer, he, she, or they may
appeal therefrom to THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT
SHALL THEN BE, and such appeal shall be transmitted by the
auditor- eneral to the clerk of the said court, to be by him en-
tered of record, subject to like proceedings under the directions
of the state treasurer as in common suits . . ."
*Dickinson College, A.B., 1926; Dickinson School of Law, LL.B., 1928; member of Penn-
sylvania House of Representatives, 1932-41; majority floor leader, 1939; Judge of the Court
of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, 1941-.
lThree of the four judges of the Dauphin County Courts are Dickinsonians. They are:
Karl E. Richards, P. J. of the Orphans' Court, College, 1910; J. Paul Rupp, Law, 1925; and
Robert E. Woodside, College, 1926; Law, 1928. Wm. M. Hargest has served as President
Judge of the Common Pleas Court during the past twenty-three years.
2P.L. 228, Sec. 11.
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The Court operated under this Section in disposing of tax appeals until
ti passage of the Fiscal Code of April 9, 1929,3 which by Section 1805,
specifically repealed it, but retained its provisions generally in Section 1104
which provides for an "appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin
County from the decision of the Board of Finance and Revenue or from the
decision of the Department of Revenue or of the Department of Auditor
General, as the case may be."
Most of the cases contained in the Commonwealth Docket are appeals
taken from tax settlements under the authority of the aforesaid law.
The Act of April 7, 1870,4 as amended by the Act of May 27, 1937, 5 pro-
vides as follows:
"The court of common pleas of the county of Dauphin
and the judges of the orphans' court of Dauphin County are
hereby clothed with jurisdiction, throughout the State, for the
purpose of hearing and determining all suits, claims and de-
mands whatever, at law and in equity, in the court of common
pleas of said county, in which the Commonwealth may be the
party plaintiff for accounts, unpaid balances, unpaid liens, taxes,
penalties and all other causes of action, real, personal and mixed."
The purpose of this Act was "simply this: That while suits could be
brought in the court of common pleas of Dauphin County, by the Commonwealth,
against either natural or artificial persons, resident or located in any part of
the state, for any pecuniary demand, the attorney general might be put to the
inconvenience of following the supreme court in its peregrinations, or of going
into the remote counties of the state, to exercise the prerogative of the common-
wealth to call upon corporations to show their warrant for acts claimed to be
usurpations of rights belonging to her alone. We have no doubt, 'the true
reason of the remedy' was, that the convenience of the commonwealth required
that tribunal should be found, at the seat of government, to which her law
officer could resort in all cases in which an appeal to the courts on her behalf
should become necessary."
Justice Simpson in Comm, v. Wilkins, stated that "the evident purpose of
the said Act is that the Commonwealth when suing in her own right shall
be allowed to prosecute her claim at the seat of government and not be required
to go to other parts of the state where the defendants happen to reside. The
fact that under other legislation she has also the privilege of proceeding wher-
8P.L. 343.
AP.L. 57, 17 PS 255.
6P.L. 783.
6 Comm. v. Penna. Slatington & New England R.R. Co., 2 Dauphin 285, 286.
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ever the defendant may be found and served with process is beside the question.
For . . . she still has the absolute right to litigate her claims in Dauphin
County if she chooses so to do."
7
The passage of the Unemployment Compensation Law8 has opened a new
field which is likely to bring an increasing number of cases to the Dauphin
County Courts.
Although appeals of claimants are taken directly from the Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review to the Superior Court, Section 309 of the Act
provides that:
"If after notice of the Department any employer fails,
neglects or refuses to pay any contribution due or the interest
or penalties due thereon, the amount due may be collected by
civil action in the name of the Commonwealth . . ."
This, taken with the aforesaid Act of 1870, results in the suits being brought
in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County.
In addition to this under the amendment of April 23, 1942, to Section
304 of the Act, the Department has authority to make assessments against
employers who fail to file reports, and an appeal "to the Court of Common
Pleas of Dauphin County" may be had by any petitioner dissatisfied with the
action of the Department on his petition for re-assessment.
The first of th'ese cases are now being appealed and none has yet been
heard. No allowance by the Court-is deemed necessary and appeals are being
taken by filing the appeal along with a petition specifying all of the objections
to the assessment or re-assessment.
Many of the Acts creating the various State Boards and Commissions
contain provisions for appeals from their action to the Court of Common Pleas
of Dauphin County. A few examples are: The "Milk Control Law" of April
28, 1937; 9 the "Dental Law" of May 1, 1933;10 the "Professional Engineers
Act" of May 6, 1927; 11 the "Registered Nurses Act" of May 1, 1909; 12 and
the "Real Estate Brokers License Act" of May 1, 1929.13
Perhaps the most frequent actions now being brought before the Court
of Common Pleas of Dauphin County are writs of mandamus issued to state
officers, boards and commissions.
7271 Pa. 527.
8Act of December 5, 1936 (1937), P.L. 2897, as amended by the Act of May 18, 1937,
P.L. 658;' Act of June 20, 1939, P.L. 458; Act of May 16, 1940 (1941), P.L. 946; Act of
August 5, 1941,' P.L. 752; Act of August 5, 1941, P.L. 845; Act of April 23, 1942 (Act No.
23).
9P.L. 417, Sec. 901 el seq, 31 PS, 700 J-901 et seq.
10P.L. 216, 63 PS 120 el seq.
11P.L. 820, 63 PS 131 at seq.
12P.L. 321, 63 PS 191 et seq.
13P.L. 1216, 63 PS 431 et req.
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An interesting history of the writ, and the jurisdiction of the Courts to
issue it, is contained in the case of Comm. v. Wickersham. 4 There we find
that, "by the common law the writ of mandamus was looked upon as a high
prerogative writ which could be issued out of the Court of King's Bench alone,
where the king was originally supposed to be seated in person. The power to
issue it did not exist in any inferior tribunal . . . By an early statute (Act
of 22nd of May 1722) the Supreme Court of this state was authorized to
administer justice as fully and amply, to all intents and purposes whatsoever,
as the justice of the Court of King's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer
at Westminster or any of them may or can do. The law continued in force
. . . until the convention for forming a new constitution, in the plentitude of
its wisdom, abrogated the power altogether without conferring it on any other
tribunal. The third section of the fifth article gives authority to issue writs of
mandamus to all inferior courts but takes away original jurisdiction in all other
cases . . . The Courts of Common Pleas in the state never were authorized
to issue the high prerogative writ of mandamus until it was conferred in a very
limited form by the 18th section of the Act of June 14th, 1836, which declares
that they shall within their respective counties have the like power with the
Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus to all officers and magistrates elected
or appointed in and for the respective county, or in or for any township, dis-
trict or place within such county and to all corporations being or having their
chief place of business within such county."
In the aforesaid case it was held that no power existed in the Court to
issue a writ of mandamus to a state officer appointed by the Governor, and it
was suggested that if the Legislature intended to give any such power to the
inferior courts over the state departments it had to be brought about by direct
legislation.
Two years later by the Act of May 25, 1881,15 the Legislature provided
that, "The Court of Common Pleas of the county in which the seat of gov-
ernment is or may be located shall have the power and it shall be required
to issue the writ of mandamus to the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary
of the Commonwealth, Attorney General, Secretary of Internal Affairs, Super-
intendent of Public Instruction, State Treasurer and Auditor General, which
may be served by the Sheriff or his deputy in any county of the Commonwealth,
and thereupon like proceedings be had therein as in any other writs of manda-
mus issued out of Courts of C6mmon Pleas of this Commonwealth."
Writs of mandamus are now issued und'er authority of the Act of June
8, 1893,16 which contains the following:
1490 Pa. 311 (1879).
15P.L. 32.
16P.L. 345, as amended, 12 PS 1911.
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" . . , the court of common pleas of the county in which
the seat of government is or may be located shall have the power,
and it shall be required, to issue the writ of mandamus to all
officers of the executive department of the Commonwealth as
defined in Article IV, section one, of the Constitution, except
the Governor; all other heads of administrative departments of
the State government, except the Secretary of Banking; all
independent administrative boards or commissions of the State
government and all departmental administrative boards or com-
missions of the State government."
A recent development in the power of the Court of Common Pleas of
Dauphin County to issue writs of mandamus is found in the case of Hotel
Casey Co. v. Ross.17 Because the Fiscal Code provided for no appeal
from the action of the Board of Finance and Revenue in petitions for refund
(to be distinguished from petitions for resettlement) and because it was held
that the action of the Board was final, it was believed that there was no power
in the Court to review the action of the Board. 18 It was held, however, in the
above case that the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County could pass
upon the refusal of the Board of Finance and Revenue to grant a refund. The
matter was brought before the Court on a writ of mandamus which it was
held the Court had authority to issue in accordance with the above quoted
provisions of the Act of 1893.
PRACTICE
Regular sessions of "Commonwealth Court" are held in January, March,
June and October. Cases for these sessions are placed on the list in the office
of the Prothonotary of Dauphin County and are called by the Court on days
set in the Court Calendar. Both arguments and trials are placed on the same
list, and heard during the same sessions of the Court.
Special sessions of "Commonwealth Court" are held almost every month.
It is frequently necessary, as in election matters, to give the cases precedence
over all other work.
Almost without exception, "Commonwealth cases" are heard by a Judge
without a jury, in accordance with the provision of the Act of April 22, 1874.19
A stipulation waiving a jury trial is obtained by the Attorney General's office,
signed by counsel for all parties involved, and introduced as an exhibit at the
trial of the case.
The hearings are naturally less formal than trials before a jury. Sometimes
all four judges hear the testimony while at other times only one or two sit
17343 Pa. 573 (1942).
18 Shorts' Estate, 315 Pa. 561; also see Seidl's Appeal, 143 Pa. Super. 539.
19P.L. 109, 12 PS 688 et seq.
208
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for this purpose. At the opening of the case the Attorney General usually
makes a brief statement of the questions involved and issues to be tried. If he
desires to do so, opposing counsel is also given an opportunity to briefly state
his position to the Court before the taking of testimony.
Frequently there are very few disputed facts in these cases. The Court
encourages the parties to stipulate all facts which can be agreed upon, and the
Judges have frequently expressed from the Bench the thought that much time
could be saved if counsel would stipulate more of the facts which are not in
dispute. The Court also encourages oral stipulations which are frequently made
during the trial of the cases.
Testimony to which objection is made is frequently admitted subject to
the objection and passed upon subsequently by the Court. After taking of
testimony is concluded the case is generally placed upon the list for argument
at the next term, or a special time set therefor. Occasionally counsel desire to
submit the case on briefs, which desire is at times allowed by th'e Court. In a
few instances a brief argument is heard by the trial judge immediately after
testimony is taken.
At the present time the Court is considering separating the sessions of
Court at which trials will be held and the sessions at which arguments are
heard.
At the time of arguing the case, or submitting the briefs, counsel also
submit requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law. Generally, in
addition to writing the opinion, the Court acts separately on each one of these
requests. This is done by writing on the margin of each request, "affirmed",
"refused", "immaterial", or some qualifying remarks. Reference to these is
made in the Opinion and the requests filed as a part of the record.
The Judges are of the opinion that the requests for findings of fact and
conclusions of law are too numerous. Eighty to one hundred such requests by
each side in a single case are not unusual. The Judges are also of the opinion
that in filing exceptions counsel could generally raise the issues by fewer
exceptions. In one case the Court stated five issues as all that were raised by
one hundred and twenty exceptions.
The trial judge generally does not pass upon the case until it is argued
before the entire court en banc. The Opinion as handed down in the first
instance is not merely the opinion of the trial judge, but is the opinion of the
entire Court. For this reason exceptions to the Opinion are frequently over-
ruled as a matter of course, unless the Court's attention is called to something
which was overlooked in the original Opinion.
As most of the "Commonwealth cases" are tax appeals, brief reference to
the practice in this particular field might be advisable,
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Section 1104 of the Fiscal Code20 authorizes the appeal to the Court of
Common Pleas of Dauphin County and sets forth the practice to be followed.
We therefore quote it in its entirety:
"Any person, association, corporation, public officer, or
other debtor, aggrieved by the decision of the Board of Finance
and Revenue, or by the board's failure to act upon his or its
petition for review within ninety (90) days, may within sixty
(60) days, appeal to the court of common pleas of Dauphin
County from the decision of the Board of Finance and Revenue,
or from the decision of the Department of Revenue, or of the
Department of the Auditor General, as the case may be. Such
appeal shall be in such form as shall be prescribed by the rules of
the court of common pleas of Dauphin County. All such appeals
shall be lodged with the Department of Justice, which depart-
ment shall transmit them to the clerk of the court of common
pleas of Dauphin County and notify the appellant of the date
of filing and the term and number of the appeal.
"Every such appeal shall be accompanied with a specification
of objections to the settlement, resettlement or other decision,
as the case may b-e, and the party appealing shall enter sufficient
security, before one of the judges of the court of common pleas
of Dauphin County, within ten (10) days next after the fling
of the appeal, with the clerk, to prosecute the appeal with
effect, to pay all costs and charges which the court shall award,
and any sum of money which shall appear by the judgment of
the court to be due by such party to the Commonwealth.
"The party appealing shall file, with every such appeal, an
affidavit, containing the specification of objections, and stating
that the appeal is not taken for delay but because appellant
believes in ustice has been done by the settlement or resettlement
or other decision appealed from, and that the facts set forth
therein are true to the best of affiant's knowledge and belief. If
a corporation, limited partnership, or joint-stock association, is
the party appellant, such affidavit shall be taken by one of its
chief officers.
"Appeals taken hereunder shall be hearings de novo, but
no facts shall be admitted in evidence that were not brought to
the attention of the department making the settlement, or in the
application for resettlement, or petition for review prior to the
appeal, and set forth in the specification of objections contained
in the affidavit accompanying the appeal, unless the court shall
be satisfied that the appellant was unable, by the exercise of
reasonable diligence, to have laid such evidence before the
department making the settlement and the Board of Finance and
Revenue, and no questions shall be raised which are not included
in the specification of objections filed as hereinbefore provided.
2OAct of April 9, 1929, P.L. 343, 72 PS 1704.
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"From the judgment of the court of common pleas of
Dauphin County, an appeal may be taken by either party as in
other cases."
One of the unusual provisions of this Section is that requiring the appeal
to be lodged with the Department of Justice, which department then transmits
it to the "Clerk" of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County. In other
cases the practice is for the party taking an appeal to file it in the Court to
which the appeal is taken. The unusual method provided in this section has
been followed since the Act of 1811, supra, which povided that "the appeal
shall b'e transmitted by the Auditor General to the clerk of said Court to be by
him entered of record."
The hearings before the Court are de novo. The Commonwealth gen-
erally introduces the tax settlement, the re-settlement, if any, the opinion of
the Board of Finance and Revenue, and then calls a taxing officer or investigator
of the Department of Revenue to testify to the manner in which the settlement
was made and any facts concerning the taxpayer's business which may be
relative to the determination of the case. Stipulations of admitted facts are
frequently used.
In a recent case 2l the Commonwealth attempted, by introduction of testi-
mony before the Court, to make claim for additional items of tax for which
no claim had been made before the Board of Finance and Revenue. The Court
held that where n'ew issues were raised this could not be done. The Court,
however, has at times increased the tax over that claimed by the Commonwealth
where no new issues were involved.22
Harrisburg, Penna. ROBERT E. WOODSIDE
April 20, 1943.
2 lComm. v. West, 279 Commonwealth Docket, 1938, decided April 9, 1943.
22
Comm. v. Pomeroy's Inc., 50 Dauphin 139 (1940),
